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ARTICLE
Employee shirking and overworking: modelling the unintended
consequences of work organisation
Patrycja Antosza, Tomasz Rembiaszb and Harko Verhagenc
aUniversity College Groningen, University of Groningen, Groningen, Netherlands; bDepartment of Astronomy and Astrophysics,
University of Valencia, Valencia, Spain; cDepartment of Computer and Systems Sciences, Stockholm University, Stockholm, Sweden
ABSTRACT
Underworking (i.e. shirking) and overworking of employees can have detrimental effects for the
individual and the organisation. We develop a computational model to investigate how work
structure, specifically the way in which managers distribute work tasks amongst employees,
impacts work intensity and working time. The model draws on theories from economics, psych-
ology and management, and on empirical observations. The simulations show that when man-
agers correctly estimate task difficulty, but undervalue the employee’s competence,
opportunities for shirking are provided due to longer deadlines. Similarly, if managers overvalue
the employee’s competence, they set tighter deadlines leading to overwork. If task difficulty is
misjudged, initially only influence on employee working time is observed. However, it gradually
generates competence misjudgements, indirectly impacting the employee’s effort level. An inter-
action between competence misjudgement and task uncertainty slows the manager’s ability to
correctly estimate employee competence and prolongs initial competence misjudgements. The
study highlights the importance of applying dynamic modelling methods, which allows for test-
ing theory assumptions in silico, generating new hypotheses and offers a foundation for future
research.
Practitioner summary: A computational model was developed to investigate how the structure
of work allocation influences opportunities for shirking and overworking by employees. The
paper demonstrates how dynamic modelling can be used to explain workplace phenomena and
develop new hypotheses for further research.
Abbreviations: KSA: knowledge, skills, attitudes; MIT: motivation intensity theory
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A century ago, Frederick Taylor (1911) predicted that
elimination of soldiering (i.e. working slowly) would
have profound effects in the forms of lowering produc-
tion costs, enlarging the market, reducing unemploy-
ment and poverty, ensuring higher wages, and
decreasing working hours. Yet, shirking is still a phe-
nomenon, which every single working person has been
guilty of, at one time or another. The opposite, over-
working, is also more common than we would wish
for. Previous research, with the use of game theory,
experiments, or quantitative studies in organisations,
stressed the importance of factors such as monitoring
practices, payment scheme, type of work, organisa-
tional structure, personal engagement, or employee
empowerment (for review see Antosz 2018). In this
study, we investigate how the structure of work organ-
isation is sufficient to create opportunities for shirking
and overworking. We combine results of empirical
studies and assumptions from several theoretical per-
spectives in a single mechanism, programmed as a
computational model. Agent-based modelling was
chosen because it draws attention to the emergent
character of shirking and overworking, which can ori-
ginate from interactions between managers and
employees. Simulations of the model allow us to assess
in silico the impact of (1) adverse selection, (2) task
uncertainty, and (3) interactions between those two on
work intensity and working time of employees. The fol-
lowing section discusses the theoretical foundations of
the model.
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Theoretical background
Work intensity and working time
Evaluating work performance is a difficult task.
Theoretical approaches guiding work performance
evaluation have mainly focussed on the amount of
effort exerted by the employee1 (Albanese and van
Fleet 1985; Demski and Feltham 1978; Gachter and
Fehr 2000), although some more recent studies high-
light the importance of time spent on performing
work tasks (Paulsen 2014). In fact, the two approaches
considering the amount of effort and the amount of
working time are related, given that effort has been
conceptualised as having three main characteristics:
direction, intensity and duration (Kanfer 1990).
Direction of effort concerns the activity in which the
individual is engaged, e.g. a work task or a non-work
task. Intensity of effort defines the level of engage-
ment (i.e. work intensity). The temporal attribute refers
to the amount of time a person is engaged in the
activity (i.e. working time). A cautious reader would
surely point out that there is a relationship between
work intensity and working time. Indeed, ceteris pari-
bus, exerting more effort results in decreasing the
amount of time necessary for completing a task.
However, since an employee can at most exert 100%
of effort, there is a limit to the reduction of work-
ing time.
This article focuses on the concepts of work inten-
sity and working time, as these two represent rela-
tively easy to measure, historically applied and legally
meaningful dimensions of work performance. An
employee cannot be dismissed on the basis of low
work motivation, because it is not the employee’s
legal obligation to be motivated. However, a lawful
dismissal can occur if an employee did not work dur-
ing the contracted hours. The importance of those
concepts was also confirmed in an exploratory, empir-
ical study carried out by the authors (Antosz and
Verhagen 2020). Work intensity and working time are
usually in some way present in legislation governing
employment. For instance, in Polish regulations work
effort is related to the basic obligation of an employee
to perform work conscientiously and carefully and to
comply with the instructions of superiors related to
the work (art. 100 §1 of the Labour Code; Gersdorf,
Raczkowski and Rączka 2014). Interestingly, an obliga-
tion of conscientiousness entails that the employer
customises work to the abilities of the employee
(Baran 2016; Jaskowski and Maniewska 2016). Working
time on the other hand, according to the Polish
Labour Code, is not solely comprised of time of
effective work. It refers to the time when an employee
is at the disposal of his employer to perform work
duties. This specific legal setting governs the structure
of work organisation where the employee sells to his
employer his ability to perform work tasks in a con-
tracted amount of time and it is the employer’s
responsibility to plan an individual employee’s work to
use that time to the fullest.2 The remaining part of the
article focuses on the effects of this particular way of
organising labour practices on the opportunities to
shirk and/or overwork.
Shirking and overworking
Work intensity and working time are two dimensions
in which aberrations can occur. Aberrations take place
when an employee’s actions deviate from the manag-
er’s expectations. They can take two forms: shirking or
overworking. Individual in-depth interviews with man-
agers and white-collar lower-level employees showed
that discrepancies between existing legislation and
managerial expectations occur (Antosz 2018; Antosz
and Verhagen 2020). Most importantly, managers
want their employees to complete work tasks.3 Yet,
the law obliges them to coin their expectations into
eight-hour working days. Therefore, assuming best-
case scenario, managers define task deadlines based
on their knowledge about task difficulty and employee
competences. Incorrect estimation of a deadline
results in employees’ shirking (i.e. insufficient work
intensity or working time) or overworking (i.e. exces-
sive work intensity or working time).
Task performance
Task performance, signifying the diligent performance
of role-prescribed activities assigned by the manager
during a contracted period of time, is one dimension
of a broader concept of work performance. Task per-
formance focuses on the act of working rather than
on the outcomes of work.
Inspired by research on performance determinants
and contemporary theories of motivated action, we
focus on two direct task performance determinants,
which are individual characteristics of employees,
namely, competence and effort level (McCloy,
Campbell, and Cudeck 1994).
In the proposed computational model, competence
level is considered broadly as resource of an individual
needed for effective task performance. Competence
incorporates three domains of educational activities
originally described by Benjamin Bloom, namely,
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cognitive, affective and psychomotor (Bloom et al.
1956). The three domains became known in training
research and practice as the KSA (knowledge, skills
and attitudes) approach (Winterton, Delamare-Le
Deist, and Stringfellow 2006). Since a body of research
indicates that an employee’s position in a network
influences work performance (Sparrowe et al. 2001), in
our conceptualization, the domains were supple-
mented by social capital – resources embedded in
one’s social networks, which can be accessed or mobi-
lised through ties in those networks (Lin 2001). The
computational model we introduced further assumes
a multi-method oriented rationalistic approach to
competences, which means that competences are
attributes (a characteristic of the rationalistic tradition,
opposed to interpretive tradition highlighting that
competences are constituted by the meaning the
work takes for the worker in his/her experience of it)
possessed by workers needed for effective task per-
formance (multi-method oriented approach combining
worker- and work-oriented foci; for a review of
approaches to the conceptualisation of competences,
see Sandberg 1994; Sandberg 2000). The chosen trad-
ition of conceptualising competences is further
reflected in the formalisation present in Equation 1. By
definition, higher competence levels increase task
performance.
The second factor identified as an employee charac-
teristic directly influencing task performance is effort.
A large body of research has shown that increasing
effort positively affects task performance (e.g. Gardner
et al. 1989). Even though motivation is not a subject
of this study, and is therefore absent in the computa-
tional model, it is important to conceptually clarify the
relationship between motivation, effort and task per-
formance. Motivation is a psychological state, while
effort is a physical phenomenon. Initially, studies such
as Deci’s (1971) classic self-determination theory
experiments assumed that effort and motive strength
are linearly related and measured motivation via
exerted effort, i.e. the amount of time subjects spent
working on a task. Contemporary approaches, such as
motivational intensity theory (MIT, hereafter) which
uses psychophysiological indicators, question the lin-
earity of the relationship between the two (Richter,
Gendolla, and Wright 2016). MIT studies show that
motivation impacts task performance only indirectly,
by limiting the maximum level of exerted effort
(Wright and Brehm 1989). Since our model investi-
gates structural possibilities for shirking and overwork-
ing, rather than utilisation of those possibilities, it
assumes a direct relationship between effort and task
performance and does not investigate the role
of motivation.
The last factor assumed to influence task perform-
ance is difficulty. Studies in the MIT paradigm show
that task difficulty provides information about the
amount of resources needed to complete the task,
and therefore is linearly related to the exerted effort
(Richter, Gendolla, and Wright 2016). The computa-
tional model assumes task difficulty is characteristic of
a task per se, not of an individual performing it,
although individuals might differ with respect to how
they perceive the difficulty of a given task. The model
states that the more difficult the task, the more effort
is needed to complete it.
The role of informational advantages
The above factors influencing task performance are
associated with a certain informational advantage
structure. The employee has better knowledge regard-
ing competences and effort exerted during task per-
formance than the manager. However, neither actor
knows the true task difficulty beforehand. The first
two informational advantages are described using the
principal-agent theory.4 The third one refers to a prob-
lem of task uncertainty.
Principal-agent theory (Laffont and Martimort 2002)
is an economic theory which refers to the dilemma
that arises where one party - ‘the principal’, relies on
another - ‘the agent’ to act on their behalf, in their
best interests. A principle-agent problem arises where
the interests of the two parties are not aligned and
where they have access to different information. This
problem has been the topic of previous research in
employment situations where the principal is the
employer and the agent the employee (e.g. Biglaiser
and Mezzetti 1993; Gershkov and Perry 2012). It has
also been applied in a range of other contexts such as
project management (M€uller and Turner 2005) and
natural resource management (Hotte, Mahony, and
Nelson 2016). Applying principal-agent theory within
an employment relationship assumes that the agent’s
and principal’s goals are conflicting (e.g. the manager
wants the employee to exert maximum effort at all
times, however, the employee is effort-averse).
Two types of principal-agent problems have been
studied: adverse selection, i.e. hidden information, and
moral hazard, i.e. hidden actions (Gaivoronski and
Werner 2012; Hart and Holmstr€om 1987). In this paper,
we focus on the problem of adverse selection –
employee’s private information about his true level of
competences (Biglaiser and Mezzetti 1993; Gershkov
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and Perry 2012) and we investigate how it influences
the intensity and time of exerted effort (i.e. the prob-
lem of moral hazard). It is worth pointing out that in
the context of acquiring employment, low-skilled
agents pretend to be highly skilled to receive better
terms at the time of contracting. However, the reverse
is the case after the contract is signed. It is in the best
interest of the employee not to disclose how high his
competences are because it lowers his marginal price
of labour – he would have to perform more work for
the same remuneration.
Task uncertainty is the degree to which tasks are
open to chance-based, task-relevant influences (Hirst
1987). In moral hazard, the unpredictability related to
employed methods and task performance is repre-
sented by the noisy environment influencing out-
comes. In practice, managers estimate the time
sufficient to accomplish a task of certain difficulty by
an employee possessing given competences. However,
reality holds an informational advantage over manag-
ers and employees, as they merely guess the nature of
the task, with its true difficulty and complexity.
Research questions
Previous research on the principal-agent problem
shows that possibilities for engaging in shirking stem
from the imperfect observability of employee compe-
tences, which generates informational advantages on
the side of employees. Task uncertainty has also been
shown to influence performance (Belkaoui 1990). So
far, no study has investigated the impact of those fac-
tors by presenting a single, coherent mechanism of
task performance. Moreover, past analyses have
focussed on presenting a static picture of aberrations
in work intensity and working time, even though the
latter is immanently a dynamic phenomenon. We
address three questions insufficiently answered by the
existing scientific literature, namely, how to do:
1. adverse selection,
2. task uncertainty, and
3. interactions between adverse selection and task
uncertainty influence the aberrations in work
intensity and working time of employees.
Computational model of task performance
To address the research questions, the process of task
performance in organisations, utilising theoretical
approaches from several disciplines described in the
earlier sections, is operationalised in a form of a
computational model programmed in an agent-based
framework. This particular method was chosen for sev-
eral reasons. The first reason involves the subject of
scientific inquiry. Shirking and overworking are shown
as behaviours emerging from decisions of employees,
which are influenced by various factors.
Computational modelling enables (1) designing a rela-
tively complex formal model in one environment and
(2) performing simulations of that model, allowing for
systematic variations in the factors of interest. The
second reason is related to the knowledge gap about
the dynamics of shirking and overworking. Employees
in the model gradually achieve excellence in their abil-
ity to handle day-to-day work tasks. Introducing a
learning function to the model calls for a method that
allows for dynamics, where analysing the temporal
dimension is easily achieved. Third, the conceptualisa-
tion of this work should be considered as building a
foundation for further scientific development.
Although the model does not currently contain dis-
tinctive elements of a traditional agent-based model,
e.g. social networks and space, it is possible to include
these elements in the future.
The model illustrates an organisation comprised of
three employees and a set of tasks available for them
to complete (Figure 1). Each employee is characterised
by a certain level of competence, enabling him to
complete work tasks. Initially, all employees are avail-
able for receiving tasks. Once an employee is assigned
a work task, a new task of random difficulty is added
to the pool, so that ten tasks await assignment at all
times. Work tasks vary with respect to difficulty and
competence-dependence5 – a degree to which time
for completing a task depends on employee compe-
tence. Subsequent parts of this section explain the
assumptions of the model regarding task assignment,
task completion, and measuring work intensity and
working time aberrations. The next section describes
simulations of the model in various settings and ana-
lysis of the dynamics of shirking and overworking.
Task assignment
The manager, who is not physically present in the
model, assigns tasks to individual employees. Based
on individual in-depth interviews with a group of
managers, two rules of task allocation were identified
(Antosz 2018). First, tasks are assigned to available
employees. Second, task difficulty corresponds to
employee competence level, as it is perceived by the
manager. Tasks are appointed starting from the least
skilled employee. Such a rule ensures that a more
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competent employee does not receive an easier task
than his less experienced colleague. Once a task is
assigned to an employee, a deadline for completion is
established. The amount of time required for an
employee to complete a task increases with the diffi-
culty of tasks and how time-consuming they are, and
decreases with employee effort and competence
level. Competence level influences time to the
extent that a task is competence-dependent. The
manager estimates the amount of time required for
accomplishing a task to an acceptable standard by
a certain employee based on her perception of
employee competence, her perception of task diffi-
culty, and an assumption regarding the amount of
effort the employee will exert. Perception misjudge-
ments correspond to adverse selection, task uncer-
tainty and moral hazard. We assume that the time
required for performing the task i by employee j is:
tij ¼ dibi1þ aicjð Þeij (1)
where:
di – time-consumingness of task i,
bi – difficulty of task i,
ai – competence – dependence of task i,
cj – competence level of employee j (note that the
competence of employee j increases after completing
each task),
eij – effort of employee j performing task i (assumes
positive values between 0 and 1).
The degree to which a task is time-consuming is
expressed in units of time and was assumed to be
constant throughout the simulation (i.e. dij¼10 for all i
and j). The manager’s expectations were set to 0.8 of
maximum effort.
Task completion
Once the employee knows the deadline for task com-
pletion, he can choose a minimum level of effort, aim-
ing for the task to be accomplished on time. Yet, the
employee, just as his manager, might misestimate the
actual amount of time needed for task completion, as
he does not know the true task difficulty (the effect of
task uncertainty). We assume that employee’s and
manager’s perceptions of task difficulty are the same.
Table 1 presents the informational advantages imple-
mented in the computational model.
Figure 1. Screenshot of the task performance model in Netlogo interface.




Competence level cj þ ecj 1 cj cj
Effort 0.8 eij eij
Task difficulty bi þ ebi bi þ ebi bi
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As employees gain experience by performing tasks
in the organisation, they increase their competence
levels. The rate of this increase depends on the level
of already obtained competences. A novice consider-
ably increases his competences with each completed
task. As the employee becomes more competent, the
same task stimulates a smaller increase in competen-
ces, to a point where increase in competences due to
performing additional tasks becomes insignificantly
small (Minbashian and Earl 2013). Thus, we approxi-
mate the employees’ learning curve by the hyperbolic
tangent, which is a well-known function following the
described dynamics. The competence level of
employee j (cj) is expressed as follows:




cmax– maximum competence level,
Ej – work experience of employee j,
Es – scaling parameter.
The scaling parameter (Es) determines how fast
employees increase their competence levels.
Professions involving more complex tasks would be
characterised as having higher values of the scaling
parameter. Throughout the simulations, the scaling
parameter was set to a value of 500. Such a setting
assures adequate duration of each performed simula-
tion and, in effect, allows for a sufficiently detailed
level of observation.
Note that an increase in experience level does not
depend on a task’s competence-dependence nor on the
level of employee effort. For example, when two equally
competent employees perform equally difficult tasks
with different levels of effort, their work experience
increases by an equal amount. The increase simply takes
place faster for the employee exerting a greater amount
of effort. Employee work experience is updated based
on the true values of employee competence and task
difficulty. However, the manager updates her informa-
tion based on the values of employee competence and
task difficulty that she perceives.
The overall experience level of employee j (Ej) is a
function of his initial abilities (E0j) and a sum of what
he has learned after having performed his first n tasks
in the organisation:




Employees enter the organisation with different
competence levels. The initial experience level of
employee j (E0j) is translated into a specific position





















– percentage of maximum competence level of
employee j.
The simulation ends when the competence level of
every employee reaches 0.995 cmax , an arbitrary cut-
off point, which is close to a theoretical (asymptotical)
maximum of c¼ cmax ¼ 10. Once all employees have
mastered performing tasks, they do not learn signifi-
cantly more after completing additional tasks.
Aberrations in work intensity and working time
Employee’s actions can deviate from the manager’s
expectations regarding exerted effort (work intensity)
and working time. Lower/higher than expected levels
of effort and time correspond to shirking/overworking.
However, the degree of overworking with respect to
intensity is limited, as there is an upper limit on effort.
The employee can only exert a maximum of 100% of
it. Aberrations from the manager’s expectations
regarding work intensity (aberration of effort, ae) at
each point in time are calculated by subtracting the
level of effort expected by the manager from the
actual effort exerted by employee j performing task i:
aeij ¼ eoij  emij (5)
where:
eoij – objective effort exerted by employee j performing
task i,
emij – manager’s expectations regarding effort exerted
by employee j performing task i.
Working time discrepancy manifests as working for
an inadequate amount of time. Devoting less time for
work than expected is defined here as shirking with
respect to time – a situation, when an employee fin-
ishes a task earlier but waits until the deadline to
deliver it. A contrary situation, in which the employee
works more time than he was expected to, comprises
overwork with respect to time. It is assumed that the
manager abides by the law and expects a maximum
of legally defined working time from the employee.
Aberrations from the manager’s expectations regard-
ing the amount of working time (aberration of time,
at) are expressed as a percentage of working time
expected by the manager, which is spent shirking or
overworking:






toij– objective working time of employee j performing
task i,
tmij  manager’s expectations regarding working time
of employee j performing task i.
Results
The simulations were performed in the BehaviorSpace
of Netlogo 5.3.1, an integrated tool, which allows for
performing experiments with the computational
model. All the tested factors, in addition to their cate-
gories and respective values, are presented in Table 2.
The design space of these (3 5 5) yielded 75 tested
conditions – unique combinations of factor levels,
which sufficiently covered the parameter space of the
model. BahaviorSpace systematically runs each combin-
ation of factors 10 times, recording the values of the
dependent variables at every time step of
the simulation.
As the model is mainly focussed on determining
how informational advantages influence shirking/over-
working behaviour, the control condition in the
experimental design was defined by a true estimate of
initial competence misjudgement and a true estimate
of task difficulty. As expected, in the control condition,
no aberrations of time or effort occur, independently
of the initial competence level of employees.
Impact of adverse selection
The simulations show that when task difficulty is esti-
mated correctly, the manager’s incorrect evaluation of
an employee’s competences directly affects the level
of invested effort, but not the amount of time it takes
to complete a task. As anticipated by the principal-
agent theory, undervaluing employee competences
generates opportunities to shirk. On the other hand, a
belief that the employee is more competent than he
actually is results in a necessity for him to overwork in
order to complete a task on time. Naturally, similar
misjudgement (expressed as a percent of employee
competence level) generates larger aberrations of
effort for higher initial competence levels.
The effects of adverse selection on exerted effort
are only temporary, which is not predicted by the
principal-agent theory. As time goes by and employ-
ees gain proficiency in completing daily tasks, their
informational advantage decreases. Figure 2, present-
ing the dynamics of effort aberrations, seems to super-
ficially suggest that employees learn to correctly
estimate the amount of effort needed to perform a
task. This is not the case. Rather, during an employee’s
career in the organisation, the manager learns to esti-
mate the competences of her subordinate better and
is, therefore, able to set more realistic deadlines for
performed tasks. Higher values of initial competence
Figure 2. Dynamics of work intensity (work quality) aberrations depending on initial competence misjudgement, and employee’s
initial competence level. Task difficulty misjudgement¼ true estimation.
Table 2. Factors tested in the simulation.
Factor Category label Value
Initial competence level Low 2
Medium 5
High 8
Task difficulty misjudgement (ebi ) Large overestimation 0.3 bi
Small overestimation 0.1 bi
True estimation 0
Small underestimation 0.1 bi
Large underestimation 0.3 bi
Initial competence misjudgement (ecj ) Large overvaluation 0.2 cj
Small overvaluation 0.1 cj
True valuation 0
Small undervaluation 0.1 cj
Large undervaluation 0.2 cj
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misjudgement result in a longer time needed for the
discrepancy between perceived and actual competen-
ces to disappear.
Impact of task uncertainty
In comparison to adverse selection, the simulations
suggest that the relationship between task uncertainty
and work aberrations is more complex. Generally,
underestimating task difficulty by either actor leads to
a necessity to work longer than expected by the man-
ager. On the contrary, overestimating task difficulty
generates opportunities for employees to shirk
(Figure 3). Yet, this relationship is not symmetric, as
was the case of the impact of adverse selection. A
small underestimation (10% of task difficulty) results in
employees working for approx. 2.5% more than their
manager expects. A large underestimation (30% of
task difficulty) leads to working for approximately 10%
more than expected. For small (10%) and large (30%)
overestimation, the values are significantly lower - 2
and 5%, respectively. The asymmetry stems from the
way, in which working time aberrations are measured
in the model. Namely, the discrepancy between actual
and expected working time is expressed as a percent-
age of expected working time (Equation 6). Ceteris par-
ibus, in case of overestimating task difficulty the
expected working time (i.e. denominator) is higher,
and the difference between actual and expected work-
ing time (i.e. numerator) makes up a smaller fraction.
Task difficulty misjudgement operates differently than
competence misjudgement, as misestimating task diffi-
culty causes more extreme values of time aberrations,
the lower the competences in the beginning of the
organisational career. As employees become more
experienced, the effect of the initial competence level
diminishes. Competence misjudgement, on the other
hand, causes a stronger effect when employees ini-
tially have higher competences.
Interestingly, task uncertainty has a profound effect
not only on working time aberrations but also on the
manager’s perception of her subordinates’ competen-
ces. Through that mechanism, it affects the level of
effort aberrations. Even without initial competence
misjudgement, by overestimating task difficulty alone,
the manager believes that completing a task causes a
higher increase in competence than it does in reality,
thus requiring the employee to exert more effort than
expected combined with finishing the task earlier than
expected. On the contrary, believing that the task is
easier than it is creates an even a fool can do that atti-
tude, where the manager underestimates competence
development of her subordinates. The employees,
whose perceptions are also biased by task uncertainty,
underestimate the task difficulty and initially shirk
with respect to work intensity (i.e. even a fool could do
that). Over time, however, they realise that the task is
more difficult than expected, and have to work over-
time to finish it before the deadline. Even as employ-
ees reach proficiency, a mismatch between what their
competences actually are and how the manager per-
ceives them persists. Figure 4 shows the effects of
over- and under-estimating task difficulty on work
intensity, competence misjudgement and work-
ing time.
Adverse selection and task uncertainty interaction
Overestimating task difficulty prolongs the effect of
initially overestimating employee competences on
adverse selection. The manager overestimates the
competences of her subordinates for a longer time,
Figure 3. Dynamics of working time (work quantity) aberrations depending on task difficulty, misjudgement, and employee’s ini-
tial competence level. Initial competence misjudgement ¼ true estimation.
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compared to when no task uncertainty occurs. Such
overestimation results in lengthening the duration of
overworking with respect to effort and causes shirking
with respect to working time. Similarly, underestimat-
ing task difficulty prolongs the effect of initial under-
valuing employee competences on competence
misjudgement.
In the cases where perception errors are opposite
for managers and employees, initial competence mis-
judgement compensates for task difficulty misjudge-
ment only to a small degree. In rare cases, large
misevaluation of employee competences at initialisation
(by 20%) decreases the effect of small misestimations
of task difficulties (by 10%) on competence
misjudgement, so that the manager does not end up
making two opposite judgement errors throughout the
employee’s career (e.g. initially overvaluing employee
competences and, over time, undervaluing them).
Minor misestimations of task difficulty prohibit the
manager from discovering the true levels of employee
competences even after the employee has gained
proficiency. We also observe that overestimating task
difficulty leads to smaller informational advantages
regarding competences, compared to underestimating
them. This finding is a consequence of the asymmetry
in the effects of task difficulty misjudgement,
which was described at the beginning of the previ-
ous section.
Figure 4. Dynamics of work intensity (work quality), working time (work quantity), and competence misjudgement depending on
task difficulty misjudgement. Initial competence level¼ low, Initial competence misjudgement¼ true estimation.
ERGONOMICS 1005
Conclusions
Shirking and overworking can have negative conse-
quences for both individual employees and the organ-
isation providing employment. Studies show that the
most popular activities employees engage in, instead
of performing work tasks, include: browsing the
Internet for personal use (anything from receiving
emails to online games or gambling), socialising with
co-workers and conducting personal business (Carroll
2007; Poppick 2016; Salary.com 20146). However, in
real life, employees also have far more imaginative
ways of spending time at work. In a survey for
Careerbuilder.com, 2138 hiring managers and HR per-
sonnel shared some stories. Actual examples included
blowing bubbles in sub-zero weather to see if the
bubbles would freeze and break, shaving legs in the
women’s restroom, claiming to be praying while sleep-
ing or warming bare feet under a hand dryer. David
Bolchover (2005) offers even more graphic examples
such as using drugs or having sex with work col-
leagues. Detrimental effects of such behaviours on
employee motivation and productivity are easy to
imagine. Excessively long working hours negatively
impact employees’ health (e.g. cause disturbed sleep-
ing patterns, increased incidence of cardiovascular dis-
ease, gastrointestinal and reproductive disorders,
musculoskeletal disorders, chronic infections, mental
health illnesses; Afonso, Fonseca, and Pires 2017;
Tucker and Folkard 2012), their job performance (e.g.
burnout, occupational accidents; Tokuda et al. 2009),
and family/social life (Fagan et al. 2012). In extreme
cases, consequences are fatal. In Japan, where working
long hours is relatively frequent, phenomena of kar-
oshi, i.e. sudden death due to overworking, usually a
direct result of acute cardiovascular events such as
stroke and karojisatsu, i.e. suicide due to overwork, are
recognised (Hiyama and Yoshihara 2008).
Numerous theories highlight that task performance
is decreased due to conflicts between employees and
their supervisors. While shirking and overworking can
certainly be the effects of power struggles involving
demotivated employees or overdemanding managers,
studies suggest that it is often not the case (Paulsen
2014). We presented a computational model to answer
a deeply sociological question, namely, can the struc-
ture of work organisation, in combination with adverse
selection and task uncertainty, generate opportunities
for unintended functions, i.e. shirking and overworking
(Merton 1996). Our model, ascribing no ill will to any
of the involved actors, shows that these phenomena
can occur in any type of work contracted on the basis
of working time, when the specific organisation of
work depicted by the computational model takes
place, i.e. components such as employees, manager,
tasks, deadlines, etc., and operations such as assigning
tasks, completing tasks, etc. are present. Contrary to
initial intuitions, the model is not only applicable in
the contexts of blue-collar work. Even though more
flexible work arrangements are gaining popularity (e.g.
task-based contracts, where working time is not a con-
cern), the majority of employees in the western world
are still contracted for working time (Katz and Krueger
2016; Ter Weel et al. 2018). Moreover, principals of
project work are becoming ever present – nowadays
even doctors often have 15-minute deadlines per
patient visit. All of the interviewed managers and
lower level employees, whose stories helped in speci-
fying the assumptions of the computational model,
were white-collar workers, including doctors, lawyers
and programmers (Antosz and Verhagen 2020). In this
context, it is important to remember that the results
of the simulations should be interpreted as acceptable
possibilities within the system. Situation runs illustrate
maximum levels of shirking of an employee, whose
unaware manager is satisfied with work performance,
or maximum levels of overworking due to a manager,
who, to the best of her knowledge, had no intentions
of delegating overtime.
With respect to adverse selection, the simulations
mirror the predictions of principal-agent theory (e.g.
Hart and Holmstr€om 1987) and generate new plaus-
ible hypotheses. The results show that undervaluing
employee competences generates opportunities to
shirk. The larger the undervaluation, the greater the
intensity of opportunistic behaviour. On the other
hand, a belief that the employee is more competent
than he actually is results in a necessity for him to
work harder than assumed by his manager in order to
complete a task on time. New hypotheses predict that
adverse selection affects primarily one dimension of
aberrations from managerial expectations, i.e. aberra-
tions of effort. Moreover, the effects of adverse selec-
tion are only temporary – as the employees gain
experience, the managers learn their true abilities.
Our research shows that task uncertainty is a very
serious source of aberrations from managerial expecta-
tions, as it impacts both working time and, indirectly,
employee effort. Interestingly, if task difficulty mis-
judgement is of equal level but in the opposite direc-
tion, overworking is more severe than shirking. This
finding portrays actors’ perception of time. For
example, let us consider a task that objectively
requires two days to finish. In the first scenario, the
manager overestimates the difficulty of the task and
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sets the deadline for three days. In the second scen-
ario, she/he underestimates it and sets the deadline
for one day. Assuming the employee informs the man-
ager about completing a task immediately (after two
days), in the first case, he/she only decreased the time
of completion by 33%. In the second case, it took
him/her twice as long as it was expected. Such a
setup results in managers experiencing poor perform-
ance as unproportionally exaggerated, compared to
superior performance. Another unanticipated result is
that task uncertainty can create an effect of adverse
selection (employee informational advantages regard-
ing competence levels). Misestimating task difficulty
leads to the manager misestimating the increase in
employee competences, which in turn affects the
effort aberrations. Moreover, the asymmetry of the
effects of opposite directions of task uncertainty
influences the level of informational advantages.
Specifically, overestimating task difficulty leads to
smaller informational advantages regarding competen-
ces, compared to underestimating them.
Limitations and further developments
Conceptualising models always entails a trade-off
between simplicity and applicability to real-life situa-
tions. Therefore, several decisions were made to
reduce complexity and achieve the primary purpose
of the model. Those decisions limit the scope of the
model and further applicability of its results. This
model should, therefore, be regarded as an ideal type
(Weber 1949) or a typification (Boero and
Squazzoni 2005).
The proposed mechanism is limited to the struc-
tural origin of shirking and overworking. It is debate-
able to what extent techniques, which are detached
from real-life data, can offer reliable estimates of phe-
nomena. Computational modelling belongs to a group
of in silico techniques, which allow for perfect control
of all confounding factors. It must be emphasised that
in real life, on top of structural, other factors influence
the level of shirking and overworking. The impossibil-
ity of including all of them even in the most rigorously
controlled experiment points to the challenge of veri-
fying model validity. However, to cite the classic, the
most that can be expected from any model is that it
can supply a useful approximation to reality: all models
are wrong; some models are useful (Box, Hunter, and
Hunter 2005; 440). Hopefully, this model is, in fact,
useful in making attempts to estimate the possibilities
of shirking and overworking, which stem from the
structure of the work process in organisations. Even
though no quantitative empirical data was used to
validate the predictions of the model, it does not
mean that the model is completely unvalidated. The
existence of certain independent variables, the rela-
tionships across and between these variables, as well
as the concept of shirking and overworking are
strongly rooted in theoretical approaches (e.g. princi-
pal-agent theory) and empirical data (e.g. Antosz 2018;
Antosz and Verhagen 2020). This supports the concept
and criterion validity of the model’s underlying
assumptions. Also, the fact that some simulation
results are consistent with predictions occurring in
other studies (e.g. Hart and Holmstr€om 1987) strength-
ens the validity of the proposed mechanism.
Naturally, the presented computational model can
become a foundation for further scientific advance-
ments. Future directions for development include, for
example, introducing interactions among employees.
In-depth interviews (Antosz 2018; Antosz and
Verhagen 2020) suggest that employees increase their
competence levels through interacting with others
and use social learning to estimate the acceptable lev-
els of shirking and overworking in their workplace.
Another increase in model complexity entails introduc-
ing heterogeneity with respect to task uncertainty.
There are two distinctive groups of managers, who dif-
fer in their personal experience of performing the
same work tasks as their subordinates (Antosz 2018;
Antosz and Verhagen 2020). Managers who previously
performed the same work tasks as their now-
subordinates are less prone to task uncertainty than
managers, who have not. Introducing trust and repu-
tation is another attractive direction for further model
development. Employees, whose violation of
organisational norms regarding shirking is detected by
co-workers, could be punished by the means of
decreasing their reputation. This direction is especially
interesting because reputation has previously been
treated as a tool for social control in computational
models (Hales 2002). Lastly, several studies suggest
that in some settings competences negatively impact
effort (Szumowska, Szwed, Kossowska and Wright
2017). Yet, as both competences and effort positively
affect task performance, the more subtle, direct rela-
tionship between them is cancelled out and therefore,
difficult to observe in experimental settings.
Computational modelling and simulation, allowing for
more scrutiny in controlling the possible complex rela-
tionship between independent variables, could shed
light on that relationship. Last but not the least, to
shed light on strategies combating overworking
among employees, future directions also include
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building models based on occupational stress and
workload management approaches, such as the job
demands-resources model.
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Notes
1. The motivation to focus on inputs, rather than outputs
of labour stems from the fact that quality of work
products is not a simple function of resources invested
by the employee (Alchian and Demsetz 1972).
2. For a more complete analysis, please see Antosz and
Verhagen 2020.
3. For simplicity, work tasks are assumed to be completed
when they comply with the quality standards held by
the manager.
4. Other important theoretical frameworks used to study
the phenomenon of shirking in the labour market
include inspection games (Dresher 1962) and efficiency
wages (Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984). For a comparison of
these approaches, see Antosz 2018.
5. Competence-dependence on its own does not influence
the amount of time required for task completion, it only
does so in combination with employee competence
level. Low values of competence-dependence indicate
that increased competences do not decrease the time of
completing a task significantly. Difficulty and
competence-dependence are assumed to be positively
related, i.e. the more skills required to complete a task
within a certain period of time, the more difficult
that task.
6. For a comparative review of the survey results, see
Antosz 2018.
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